By: Shaheen H.B. No. 3792
 
 
 
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
 
AN ACT
  relating to protecting the population of Texas, its environment,
  and its most vulnerable communities, promoting the resilience of
  the electric grid and certain municipalities.
         BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
         SECTION 1.  The legislature finds that:
               (1)  electric grid blackouts threaten the lives of the
  citizens of Texas and pose a disproportionally large risk to the
  elderly, vulnerable and underprivileged within our state and
  especially communities facing environmental justice issues such as
  disproportionate environmental health burdens and population
  vulnerabilities to facilities such as chemical plants and
  refineries that can become environmental disaster areas when taken
  offline due to loss of electricity.
               (2)  all 16 critical infrastructures identified in
  President Barack Obama's Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21)
  including water and wastewater services; food and agriculture;
  communications systems; the energy sector including refineries and
  fuel distribution systems; chemical plants; the financial sector;
  hospitals and health care facilities; law enforcement and
  government facilities; nuclear reactors; and countless other
  critical functions depend on the state's electric grid, making the
  grid's protection vital to our economy and homeland security;
               (3)  the February 2021 Texas Blackout caused death and
  suffering to the citizens of Texas, economic loss to the Texas
  economy, impacts to all critical infrastructures in Texas, the
  dispatch of generation units that likely exceeded Environmental
  Protection Agency (EPA) limits for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide,
  mercury, and carbon monoxide emissions, as well as wastewater
  release limits, radically increased pricing of electricity that
  resulted in electric power bills unaffordable by many customers
  across the state, and exacerbated the COVID-19 pandemic risk by
  forcing many of the state's citizens to consolidate at warming
  centers and in other small spaces where warmth for survival
  superseded social distancing;
               (4)  a previous large-scale blackout occurred in Texas
  in February 2011 during which 4.4 million customers were affected;
               (5)  this state is uniquely positioned to prevent
  blackouts because it is a net exporter of energy and is the only
  state with an electric grid almost exclusively within its
  territorial boundaries;
               (6)  the 2011 and 2021 blackouts call into question
  whether too much risk has been accepted regarding weatherization of
  electric generation infrastructure, whether the state lacks the
  internal distribution structure and control systems to manage
  rolling blackouts, and whether sufficient resources have been
  allocated toward overall grid resilience;
               (7)  Governor Gregg Abbott has declared reform of the
  Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) as an emergency
  item for the 87th Texas Legislature;
               (8)  public confidence in the resilience of the Texas
  electric grid is essential to ensuring environmental justice,
  economic prosperity, domestic tranquility, continuity of
  government, and life-sustaining systems;
               (9)  a resilient Texas electric grid that offers
  businesses continuity of operations in the event of a natural or
  man-made disaster will be an unrivaled attraction for businesses to
  expand or move their operations to this state and for protecting
  what is important to Texas, ranging from its military installations
  to its environment;
               (10)  insufficient market incentives or regulations
  exist for electric utilities to prioritize security and resilience,
  and to protect the grid against "all hazards;"
               (11)  protection of the Texas electric grid against
  "all hazards" would assure businesses and the citizens of this
  state that the "lights will be back on first in Texas" in the event
  of a nationwide catastrophe affecting electric infrastructure,
  sparing catastrophic societal and environmental consequences for
  this state;
               (12)  when this state begins implementation of the "all
  hazards resilience" plan to protect the state's electric grid,
  short-term and long-term economic benefit will far exceed even the
  most optimistic estimates of the conventional economic incentives
  provided by tax abatements to attract businesses to this state;
         SECTION 2.  Subtitle B, Title 2, Utilities Code, is amended
  by adding Chapter 44 to read as follows:
  CHAPTER 44. GRID RESILIENCE
         Sec. 44.001.  DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:
         1)  "All hazards resilience" of the electric grid means
  protections against threats caused by:
         A.  terrestrial weather including wind, hurricanes,
  tornadoes, flooding, ice storms, extended cold weather events, heat
  waves, or wildfires;
         B.  seismic events including earthquakes or tsunamis;
         C.  physical threats including terrorist attack with direct
  fire, drones, explosives or other methods of physical sabotage;
         D.  cyberattacks including through malware or hacking of
  unprotected or compromised Information Technology (IT) networks,
         E.  manipulation of Operational Technology (OT) devices
  including sensors, actuators, or drives;
         F.  electromagnetic threats through man-made radio frequency
  (RF) weapons, high altitude nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP), or
  naturally occurring geomagnetic disturbances (GMD),
         G.  electric generation supply chain vulnerabilities
  including insecure or inadequate fuel transportation, or storage;
  and
         H.  "insider threats" caused by compromised or hostile
  personnel working within government and/or the utility industry.
               (2)  "EMP Commission reports" means all reports
  released by the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States
  from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, including the July 2017
  report titled "Recommended E3 HEMP Heave Electric Field Waveform
  for the Critical Infrastructures."
               (3)  "Micro-grid" means a group of interconnected loads
  and distributed energy resources inside clearly defined electrical
  boundaries that act as a single controllable entity with respect to
  the grid.
               (4)  "Security commission" means the Texas Grid
  Security Commission.
         Sec. 44.002.  TEXAS GRID SECURITY COMMISSION.  (a)  The
  security commission shall report to the Chief of the Texas Division
  of Emergency Management (TDEM) and is composed of the following
  members:
               (1)  a representative of the Texas Division of
  Emergency Management appointed by the chief of the division;
               (2)  a representative of the State Office of Risk
  Management appointed by the risk management board;
               (3)  a representative of the independent organization
  certified under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT region appointed by
  the chief executive officer of the organization;
               (4)  a representative of the Texas Military Department
  appointed by the adjutant general of the department;
               (5)  a representative of the Texas Military
  Preparedness Commission appointed by the military preparedness
  commission;
               (6)  a representative of the Office of State-Federal
  Relations appointed by the director of the office;
               (7)  a representative of the Department of Information
  Resources appointed by the executive director of the department;
               (8)  a representative of power generation companies
  appointed by the chief of the Texas Division of Emergency
  Management;
               (9)  two representatives of transmission and
  distribution utilities appointed by the chief of the Texas Division
  of Emergency Management;
               (10)  three members of the public with expertise in
  critical infrastructure protection, to represent the public
  interest.
               (11)  one representative appointed by the chief of the
  Texas Division of Emergency Management from each of the following
  essential services sectors:
                     (A)  law enforcement;
                     (B)  emergency services;
                     (C)  communications;
                     (D)  water and sewer services;
                     (E)  health care;
                     (F)  financial services;
                     (G)  food and agriculture;
                     (H)  transportation; and
                     (I)  energy.
               (12)  an expert in the field of higher education
  appointed by the chief of the Texas Division of Emergency
  Management.
               (13)  an expert in the field of electricity markets and
  regulations appointed by the chief of the Texas Division of
  Emergency Management.
         (b)  The chief of the Texas Division of Emergency Management
  may invite members or former members of the United States Air
  Force's Electromagnetic Defense Task Force (EDTF) to the security
  commission.
         (c)  The Texas Division of Emergency Management shall
  designate a member of the security commission to serve as presiding
  officer.
         (d)  The security commission shall convene at the call of the
  presiding officer.
         (e)  A vacancy on the security commission is filled by
  appointment for the unexpired term in the same manner as the
  original appointment.
         (f)  Members of the security commission will primarily be
  residents of the state of Texas or bordering states within ERCOT's
  jurisdiction. However, the presiding officer or the chief of the
  Texas Division of Emergency Management may invite additional
  subject matter experts including, but not limited to, those
  recognized as experts in the fields of electricity markets,
  cybersecurity of grid control systems, EMP mitigation, terrestrial
  and solar weather, and micro-grids from outside Texas as needed.
         Sec. 44.003.  GRID RESILIENCE INFORMATION.  (a)  Some
  information used in determining the vulnerabilities of the electric
  grid or that is related to measures to be taken to protect the grid
  may be confidential and not subject to Chapter 552, Government
  Code.
         (b)  Information deemed confidential by Subsection (a) shall
  be stored and maintained by the independent organization certified
  under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT region.
         (c)  The following members of the security commission will
  lead an information security working group and shall apply for a
  secret security clearance or an interim secret security clearance
  to be granted by the federal government:
               (1)  the representative of the independent
  organization certified under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT region;
               (2)  the representative of the Texas Division of
  Emergency Management; and
               (3)  the representative of the State Office of Risk
  Management.
         (d)  The information security working group will determine
  what information should be categorized as confidential information
  as described by Subsection (a), which particular members of the
  security commission may access various types of information, and
  which additional members should apply for a secret security
  clearance or interim clearance granted by the federal government.
         (e)  With regard to confidential information as described by
  Subsection (a), a reasonable balance of public transparency shall
  be maintained. Nothing in this section abrogates any rights or
  remedies under Chapter 552, Government Code.
         Sec. 44.004.  GRID RESILIENCE EVALUATION.  (a)  The security
  commission will evaluate all hazards to the ERCOT electric grid by
  utilizing all available information on past blackouts in the ERCOT
  system as well as threats which can cause future blackouts
  utilizing the definition of "all hazards resilience" in Sec.
  44.001(1). The commission may create sub-groups or teams to address
  each hazard as needed and must assess hazards both on the likelihood
  and the level of consequence of each hazard.
         (b)  The security commission shall identify methods where
  the state can support an overall National Deterrence Policy as
  proposed by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission by:
         i)  identifying how to ensure all hazards resilience for
  electric utilities supporting critical national security functions
  within the state; and
         ii)  engaging the Texas National Guard to be trained as first
  responders to cybersecurity threats to the ERCOT grid and other
  critical infrastructures.
         (c)  The security commission shall evaluate the state's
  nuclear generation sites and the all hazards resilience of the
  reactors as well as off-site power for critical safety systems that
  support the reactor and spent fuel. The commission has direct
  liaison authority to communicate with the Nuclear Regulatory
  Commission (NRC) to accomplish this evaluation.
         (d)  The security commission shall evaluate current Critical
  Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards established by the North
  American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the National
  Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards to determine
  the most appropriate standards for protecting the state's grid
  infrastructure.
         (e)  The security commission shall explore what local
  communities and other states have done to address grid resilience,
  The commission may request funding to conduct site visits to these
  locations as required.
         (f)  The security commission shall identify Texas-based
  universities which can contribute with expertise in cybersecurity
  and other areas to mitigate all hazards.
         (g)  The security commission shall solicit information from
  defense contractors with experience protecting defense systems
  from EMP, as well as electric utilities who have developed EMP
  protections for their grid assets.
         (h)  The security commission shall solicit information from
  the United States Department of Homeland Security which has
  published Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Protection and Resilience
  Guidelines for Critical Infrastructure and Equipment that can be
  used to mitigate the effects of such a disaster.
         (i)  The security commission will solicit information from
  the Congressional EMP Commission which assesses that protection
  against the worst threat, nuclear EMP attack, will mitigate lesser
  threats.
         Sec. 44.005.  CONTRACTOR SUPPORT FOR CRITICAL SYSTEM AND
  COMPONENT RESILIENCE.  (a)  With the assistance of the security
  commission the State Office of Risk Management shall select
  contractors with proven expertise to identify critical systems and
  components of the ERCOT electric grid vulnerable to "all hazards,"
  with a specific emphasis on the most dangerous cyber and
  electromagnetic threats. The contractors must have the
  demonstrated expertise to identify the critical components,
  including industrial control systems, before the expiration of six
  months after the date the contractors are engaged.
         (b)  Not later than January 1, 2023, an entity that owns or
  operates a component identified by the contractor under Subsection
  (a) as critical shall upgrade the components as necessary for the
  components to meet the applicable standard proposed in the EMP
  Commission reports.
         (c)  The State Office of Risk Management shall select
  contractors with demonstrated expertise to verify whether affected
  entities have identified potential affected systems and components
  and whether these entities have upgraded systems and components as
  required by Subsection (b).
         Sec. 44.006.  PLAN FOR ALL HAZARDS RESILIENCE. (a) Not
  later than January 1, 2022, the security commission shall prepare
  and deliver to the legislature a plan for protecting the ERCOT grid
  from a catastrophic loss of power in the state.
         (b)  The plan must include:
               (1)  provisions for determining weatherizing
  requirements to prevent blackouts from extreme cold weather events,
  whether these requirements will induce cyber vulnerabilities, and
  the associated costs for these requirements not later than January
  1, 2022;
               (2)  provisions for installing, replacing, or
  upgrading industrial control systems and associated networks (or
  the use of compensating controls/procedures) in critical
  facilities to address cyber vulnerabilities not later than January
  1, 2022;
               (3)  provisions for installing, replacing, or
  upgrading extra high-voltage power transformers and supervisory
  control and data acquisition systems to withstand 100
  kilovolts/meter E1 electromagnetic pulses and 85 volts/kilometer
  E3 electromagnetic pulses not later than January 1, 2026;
               (4)  a timeline for upgrading remaining infrastructure
  to meet recommendations of the EMP Commission reports;
               (5)  long-term resilience provisions for supporting
  industries including:
                     (A)  nuclear reactors, materials, and waste;
                     (B)  fuel supply;
                     (C)  health care;
                     (D)  communications;
                     (E)  water and sewer services;
                     (F)  food supply; and
                     (G)  transportation.
               (6)  any additional provisions considered necessary by
  the security commission.
         (c)  The security commission may consult with the Private
  Sector Advisory Council in developing the plan.
         (d)  The Texas Division of Emergency Management shall
  incorporate the plan into the state emergency management plan and
  update the state emergency management plan as necessary to
  incorporate progressive resilience improvements.
         Sec. 44.007.  ALTERNATIVE TIMELINE OR STANDARD.  A panel
  composed of members of the security commission may approve a
  resilience standard or implementation timeline for an electric
  utility or other entity that differs from a resilience standard or
  implementation timeline adopted under Section 44.005.
         Sec. 44.008.  RESILIENCE COST RECOVERY.  A regulatory
  authority shall include in establishing the rates of an electric
  utility consideration of the costs incurred to install, replace, or
  upgrade facilities or equipment to meet a resilience standard
  established under this chapter.  A regulatory authority shall
  presume that costs incurred to meet a resilience standard under
  this chapter are reasonable and necessary expenses.
         Sec. 44.009.  MICRO-GRIDS.  (a)  The security commission
  shall establish resilience standards for micro-grids and certify a
  micro-grid that meets the standards. These standards must be
  developed for both alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC)
  micro-grids.
         (b)  Except as provided by Subsection (c), a municipality or
  other political subdivision may not enact or enforce an ordinance
  or other measure that bans, limits, or otherwise regulates inside
  the boundaries or extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
  municipality or political subdivision a micro-grid that is
  certified by the security commission under this section.
         (c)  The owner or operator of a micro-grid certified by the
  security commission is a power generation company and is required
  to register under Section 39.351(a). The owner or operator of the
  micro-grid is entitled to:
               (1)  interconnect the micro-grid;
               (2)  obtain transmission service for the micro-grid;
  and
               (3)  use the micro-grid to sell electricity and
  ancillary services at wholesale in a manner consistent with the
  provisions of this title and commission rules applicable to a power
  generation company or an exempt wholesale generator.
         SECTION 3.  Chapter 380, Local Government Code, is amended
  by adding Section 380.004 to read as follows:
         Sec. 380.004.  FIVE STAR GOLD RESILIENT COMMUNITIES. (a)
  The Texas Grid Security Commission shall establish resilience
  standards for municipalities in the following essential service
  areas:
               (1)  emergency services;
               (2)  communications systems;
               (3)  clean water and sewer services;
               (4)  health care systems;
               (5)  financial services;
               (6)  energy systems; and
               (7)  transportation systems.
         (b)  Standards for energy systems under Subsection (a) must
  include provisions to ensure that energy, electric power, and fuel
  supplies are protected and available for recovery in the event of a
  catastrophic power outage.
         (c)  On the application of a municipality for the
  designation, the Texas Grid Security Commission may designate a
  municipality that meets the resilience standards in the applicable
  service area as:
               (1)  a Resilient Emergency Services Community;
               (2)  a Resilient Communications Systems Community;
               (3)  a Resilient Clean Water and Sewer Services
  Community;
               (4)  a Resilient Health Care Systems Community;
               (5)  a Resilient Financial Services Community;
               (6)  a Resilient Energy Community; or
               (7)  a Resilient Transportation Community.
         (d)  The Texas Grid Security Commission may designate a
  municipality that meets the resilience standards in five of the
  seven service areas as a Five Star Gold Resilient Community.
         (e)  A municipality may not use a resilient community
  designation in advertising, marketing, or economic development
  initiatives unless the Texas Grid Security Commission has awarded
  the municipality with the designation in the applicable service
  area or as a Five Star Gold Resilient Community.
         (f)  A municipality that does not qualify in at least five of
  the seven areas as a resilient community may not offer economic
  incentives or tax abatements for any purposes for any entity to
  locate in the municipality.
         SECTION 4.  Not later than January 1, 2023, the Texas Grid
  Security Commission shall prepare and deliver a report to the
  legislature on the progress of implementing resilience standards
  adopted under Sections 44.004 and 44.005, Utilities Code, as added
  by this Act.
         Section 5.  Not later than January 1 of each year, the
  commission shall prepare and deliver a non-classified report to the
  legislature, the Governor and the Public Utility Commission of
  Texas assessing natural and man-made threats to the electric grid
  and efforts to mitigate the threats. Such report shall be prepared
  for public distribution The commission shall hold confidential or
  classified briefings with officials as necessary.
         SECTION 6.  This Act takes effect immediately if it receives
  a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, as
  provided by Section 39, Article III, Texas Constitution. If this
  Act does not receive the vote necessary for immediate effect, this
  Act takes effect September 1, 2021.