BILL ANALYSIS

S.B. 330

By: Hall

State Affairs

Committee Report (Unamended)

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

A sustained supply of electricity is one of the most important components to sustaining the everyday lives of Texans, as it impacts almost every aspect of modern life. Failing to ensure that the state has an adequate plan in place to address a widespread, long-term power outage could jeopardize the well-being and safety of Texans throughout the state should the grid go down.

As evidenced during Winter Storm Uri, the loss of electrical power can also lead to the loss of gas and water. If corresponding critical infrastructure for water and wastewater systems, food and agriculture, communication systems, the energy sector, chemical plants, the financial sector, hospitals and health care facilities, law enforcement and government facilities, and nuclear reactors are not also addressed, efforts to harden the electric grid may be futile.

S.B. 330 seeks to create the Texas Grid Security Commission to evaluate all hazards to the ERCOT electric grid, including threats that can cause future outages, and the resilience of municipalities in Texas.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE IMPACT

It is the committee's opinion that this bill does not expressly create a criminal offense, increase the punishment for an existing criminal offense or category of offenses, or change the eligibility of a person for community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision.

RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

It is the committee's opinion that this bill does not expressly grant any additional rulemaking authority to a state officer, department, agency, or institution.

ANALYSIS

S.B. 330 amends the Utilities Code to establish the Texas Grid Security Commission, which is composed of the following members:

· a representative of the Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM) appointed by the chief of TDEM;

· a representative of the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) appointed by the PUC;

· a representative of the Railroad Commission of Texas (RRC) appointed by the RRC;

· a representative of ERCOT appointed by the CEO of ERCOT;

· a representative of power generation companies appointed by the chief of TDEM; and

· a representative of transmission and distribution utilities appointed by the chief of TDEM.

S.B. 330 provides the following with respect to the administration and operation of the security commission:

· the chief of TDEM may invite members or former members of the U.S. Air Force's Electromagnetic Defense Task Force to advise the security commission;

· TDEM must designate a member of the security commission to serve as presiding officer;

· the presiding officer may invite to advise the security commission any person whose expertise the commission considers necessary to carry out the purposes of the bill;

· the security commission must convene at the call of the presiding officer;

· the security commission must report to the chief of TDEM;

· a vacancy on the security commission is filled by appointment for the unexpired term in the same manner as the original appointment;

· individuals appointed to the security commission, to the extent possible, must be Texas residents; and

· the presiding officer of the security commission or the chief of TDEM may invite subject matter experts to advise the commission regardless of whether the invited individual is a Texas resident.

S.B. 330 requires the members of the security commission who are representatives of ERCOT, TDEM, and the PUC to apply for a secret security clearance or an interim secret security clearance to be granted by the federal government and establishes that such a member who is granted an applicable security clearance is a member of the information security working group. The bill provides the following with respect to that working group:

· the working group must determine:

o which information created or obtained by the security commission is confidential;

o which members of the security commission may access which types of information received by the commission; and

o which members, other than members of the working group, should apply for a secret security clearance or interim clearance granted by the federal government;

· information that the information security working group determines is confidential must be stored and maintained by ERCOT;

· the security commission must maintain a reasonable balance between public transparency and security for information determined to be confidential; and

· confidential information created or obtained by the security commission is exempt from disclosure under state public information law and a meeting of the security commission that involves the discussion of confidential information is exempt from state open meetings law.

S.B. 330 requires the security commission to evaluate, using available information on past power outages in ERCOT, all hazards to the ERCOT electric grid, including threats that can cause future outages. The security commission must evaluate the resilience of municipalities in Texas in the following essential areas:

· emergency services;

· communications systems;

· water and sewer services;

· health care systems;

· financial services;

· energy systems, including an evaluation of whether energy, electric power, and fuel supplies are protected and available for recovery in the event of a catastrophic power outage; and

· transportation systems.

The bill authorizes the security commission to create groups or teams to identify and address each hazard as necessary and requires the security commission to assess each hazard both on the likelihood of occurrence of the hazard and the potential consequences of the hazard.

S.B. 330 specifies that "all hazards" includes the following:

· terrestrial weather including wind, hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding, ice storms, extended cold weather events, heat waves, and wildfires;

· seismic events including earthquakes and tsunamis;

· physical threats including terrorist attacks with direct fire, drones, explosives, and other methods of physical sabotage;

· cyber attacks including malware attacks and hacking of unprotected or compromised information technology networks;

· manipulation of operational technology devices including sensors, actuators, and drives;

· electromagnetic threats through man-made radio frequency weapons, high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic pulse, and naturally occurring geomagnetic disturbances;

· electric generation supply chain vulnerabilities including insecure or inadequate fuel transportation or storage; and

· insider threats caused by compromised or hostile personnel working within government or the utility industry.

S.B. 330 requires the security commission to take the following actions:

· identify methods by which the state can support an overall national deterrence policy as proposed by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, including by:

o identifying means to ensure that all hazards resilience for electric utilities supports critical national security functions in Texas; and

o engaging the Texas National Guard to be trained as first responders to cybersecurity threats to the ERCOT electric grid and other critical infrastructure in Texas;

· evaluate nuclear generation sites in Texas, the resilience of each nuclear reactor to all hazards, and the resilience to all hazards of off-site power for critical safety systems that support the reactor and spent fuel;

· evaluate current Critical Infrastructure Protection standards established by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation and standards set by the National Institute of Standards and Technology to determine the most appropriate standards for protecting grid infrastructure in Texas;

· investigate the steps that local communities and other states have taken to address grid resilience; and

· identify universities based in Texas that have expertise in cybersecurity and other matters that can contribute to the security commission's goal of mitigating all hazards to the grid in Texas.

The bill authorizes the security commission to communicate with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to accomplish the evaluation of nuclear generation sites in Texas and to request funding from TDEM to conduct site visits to local communities and other states as required to investigate the steps they have taken to address grid resilience.

S.B. 330 authorizes the security commission, in carrying out its duties regarding grid resilience evaluations, to solicit information from defense contractors with experience protecting defense systems from electromagnetic pulse, electric utilities that have developed electromagnetic pulse protections for the utilities' grid assets, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack.

S.B. 330 requires the security commission, based on the findings of its grid resilience evaluations and investigations, to consider and recommend resilience standards for municipalities and critical components of the ERCOT electric grid. The bill establishes that standards considered and recommended for energy systems of municipalities should include provisions to ensure that energy, electric power, and fuel supplies are protected and available for recovery in the event of a catastrophic power outage. The bill requires the security commission, not later than October 1, 2024, to prepare and deliver a report to the legislature on the recommended resilience standards and an anticipated timeline for implementation of the standards.

S.B. 330 requires the security commission, not later than October 1, 2024, to prepare and deliver to the legislature a plan for protecting the ERCOT electric grid from all hazards, including a catastrophic loss of power in Texas. The plan must include the following:

· weatherizing requirements to prevent power outages from extreme cold weather events, an analysis of whether these requirements would induce cyber vulnerabilities, and an analysis of the associated costs for these requirements;

· provisions for installing, replacing, or upgrading industrial control systems and associated networks, or the use of compensating controls or procedures, in critical facilities to address cyber vulnerabilities;

· provisions for installing, replacing, or upgrading extra high-voltage power transformers and supervisory control and data acquisition systems to withstand 100 kilovolts/meter E1 electromagnetic pulses and 85 volts/kilometer E3 electromagnetic pulses;

· a timeline for making improvements to remaining infrastructure to meet resilience standards adopted by the security commission;

· long-term resilience provisions for supporting industries including nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; fuel supply; health care; communications; water and sewer services; food supply; and transportation; and

· any additional provisions considered necessary by the security commission.

The bill authorizes the security commission to consult with the Private Sector Advisory Council in developing the plan.

S.B. 330 requires the security commission, not later than January 1 of each year, to prepare and deliver a nonclassified report to the legislature, the governor, and the PUC assessing natural and man-made threats to the electric grid and efforts to mitigate the threats. The bill requires the security commission to make the report available to the public and authorizes the commission, in preparing the report, to hold confidential or classified briefings with federal, state, and local officials as necessary.

S.B. 330 requires the security commission to recommend resilience standards for micro-grids. The bill defines "micro-grid" as a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy resources inside clearly defined electrical boundaries. The standards must be developed for both alternating current and direct current.

S.B. 330 includes the following legislative findings:

· electric grid outages threaten the lives of the citizens of Texas and pose a disproportionately large risk to:

o the elderly, vulnerable, and underprivileged within Texas; and

o communities facing disproportionate environmental health burdens and population vulnerabilities relating to facilities such as chemical plants and refineries that can become environmental disaster areas when taken off-line due to loss of electricity;

· the 16 critical infrastructures identified in President Barack Obama's Presidential Policy Directive "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience" (PPD-21) including water and wastewater systems, food and agriculture, communications systems, the energy sector including refineries and fuel distribution systems, chemical plants, the financial sector, hospitals and health care facilities, law enforcement and government facilities, nuclear reactors, and other critical functions depend on the electric grid in Texas and make the grid's protection vital to the economy of this nation and homeland security;

· the power outage that occurred in this state in February 2021 caused:

o death and suffering in Texas;

o economic loss to the state's economy;

o impacts to all critical infrastructures in Texas;

o the dispatch of generation units that likely exceeded limits established by the Environmental Protection Agency for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, and carbon monoxide emissions and wastewater release limits;

o radically increased pricing of electricity that resulted in making electric power bills unaffordable to many customers across Texas; and

o the exacerbation of the COVID-19 pandemic risk by forcing many of the state's citizens to consolidate at warming centers and in other small spaces where warmth for survival superseded social distancing protocols;

· a previous large-scale power outage occurred in this state in February 2011 during which 4.4 million customers were affected;

· the State of Texas is uniquely positioned to prevent power outages because the state is a net exporter of energy and is the only state with an electric grid almost exclusively within its territorial boundaries;

· the 2011 and 2021 power outages call into question:

o whether too much risk has been accepted regarding weatherization of electric generation infrastructure;

o whether the state lacks the internal distribution structure and control systems to manage rolling outages; and

o whether sufficient resources have been allocated toward overall grid resilience;

· public confidence in the resilience of the electric grid in Texas is essential to ensuring economic prosperity, domestic tranquility, continuity of government, and life-sustaining systems;

· a resilient electric grid that offers businesses in Texas continuity of operations in the event of a natural or man-made disaster will be an unrivaled attraction for businesses to expand or move their operations to this state and for protecting what is important to the state, including its military installations and its environment;

· current market incentives and regulations are not sufficient for electric utilities to prioritize grid security and resilience and protect the grid against hazards;

· protection of the electric grid in Texas against hazards would assure businesses and the citizens of Texas that the "lights will be back on first in Texas" in the event of a nationwide catastrophe affecting electric infrastructure, sparing catastrophic societal and environmental consequences for the state; and

· when the state begins implementation of the plan for all hazards resilience provided for by the bill to protect the electric grid in Texas, short-term and long-term economic benefit will far exceed even the most optimistic estimates of the conventional economic incentives provided by tax abatements to attract businesses to Texas.

EFFECTIVE DATE

On passage, or, if the bill does not receive the necessary vote, September 1, 2023.