|
|
|
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
|
|
AN ACT
|
|
relating to the resilience of the electric grid and certain |
|
municipalities. |
|
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: |
|
SECTION 1. The legislature finds that: |
|
(1) electric grid outages threaten the lives of the |
|
citizens of this state and pose a disproportionately large risk to: |
|
(A) the elderly, vulnerable, and underprivileged |
|
within this state; and |
|
(B) communities facing disproportionate |
|
environmental health burdens and population vulnerabilities |
|
relating to facilities such as chemical plants and refineries that |
|
can become environmental disaster areas when taken off-line due to |
|
loss of electricity; |
|
(2) the 16 critical infrastructure sectors identified |
|
in President Barack Obama's Presidential Policy Directive |
|
"Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience" (PPD-21) |
|
(chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical |
|
manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services, |
|
energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government |
|
facilities, healthcare and public health, information technology, |
|
nuclear reactors, materials, and waste, transportation systems, |
|
water and wastewater systems) depend on the electric grid in this |
|
state and make the grid's protection vital to the economy of this |
|
nation and homeland security; |
|
(3) the power outage that occurred in this state in |
|
February 2021 caused: |
|
(A) death and suffering in this state; |
|
(B) economic loss to this state's economy; |
|
(C) impacts to all critical infrastructures in |
|
this state; |
|
(D) the dispatch of generation units that likely |
|
exceeded limits established by the Environmental Protection Agency |
|
for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, and carbon monoxide |
|
emissions and wastewater release limits; |
|
(E) radically increased pricing of electricity |
|
and made electric power bills unaffordable to many customers across |
|
this state; and |
|
(F) exacerbation of COVID-19 pandemic risk by |
|
forcing many of the state's citizens to consolidate at warming |
|
centers and in other small spaces where warmth for survival |
|
superseded social distancing protocols; |
|
(4) a previous large-scale power outage occurred in |
|
this state in February 2011 during which 4.4 million customers were |
|
affected; |
|
(5) this state is uniquely positioned to prevent power |
|
outages because this state is a net exporter of energy and is the |
|
only state with an electric grid almost exclusively within its |
|
territorial boundaries; |
|
(6) the 2011 and 2021 power outages call into |
|
question: |
|
(A) whether too much risk has been accepted |
|
regarding weatherization of electric generation infrastructure; |
|
(B) whether this state lacks the internal |
|
distribution structure and control systems to manage rolling |
|
outages; and |
|
(C) whether sufficient resources have been |
|
allocated toward overall grid resilience; |
|
(7) public confidence in the resilience of the |
|
electric grid in this state is essential to ensuring economic |
|
prosperity, domestic tranquility, continuity of government, and |
|
life-sustaining systems; |
|
(8) a resilient electric grid that offers businesses |
|
in this state continuity of operations in the event of a natural or |
|
man-made disaster will be an unrivaled attraction for businesses to |
|
expand or move their operations to this state; |
|
(9) a resilient electric grid that can operate in the |
|
event of a natural or man-made disaster will protect important |
|
facets of this state, including its military installations and |
|
environment; |
|
(10) current market incentives and regulations are not |
|
sufficient for electric utilities to: |
|
(A) prioritize grid security and resilience; and |
|
(B) protect the grid against hazards; |
|
(11) protection of the electric grid in this state |
|
against hazards would assure businesses and the citizens of this |
|
state that the "lights will be back on first in Texas" in the event |
|
of a nationwide catastrophe affecting electric infrastructure, |
|
sparing this state from catastrophic societal and environmental |
|
consequences; and |
|
(12) when this state begins implementation of the plan |
|
for all hazards resilience described by Section 44.007, Utilities |
|
Code, as added by this Act, to protect the electric grid in this |
|
state, short-term and long-term economic benefits will far exceed |
|
even the most optimistic estimates of the conventional economic |
|
incentives provided by tax abatements to attract businesses to this |
|
state. |
|
SECTION 2. Subtitle B, Title 2, Utilities Code, is amended |
|
by adding Chapter 44 to read as follows: |
|
CHAPTER 44. GRID RESILIENCE |
|
Sec. 44.001. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: |
|
(1) "All hazards" means: |
|
(A) terrestrial weather including wind, |
|
hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding, ice storms, extended cold weather |
|
events, heat waves, and wildfires; |
|
(B) seismic events including earthquakes and |
|
tsunamis; |
|
(C) physical threats including terrorist attacks |
|
with direct fire, drones, explosives, and other methods of physical |
|
sabotage; |
|
(D) cyber attacks including malware attacks and |
|
hacking of unprotected or compromised information technology |
|
networks; |
|
(E) manipulation of operational technology |
|
devices including sensors, actuators, and drives; |
|
(F) electromagnetic threats through man-made |
|
radio frequency weapons, high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic |
|
pulses, and naturally occurring geomagnetic disturbances; |
|
(G) electric generation supply chain |
|
vulnerabilities including insecure or inadequate fuel |
|
transportation or storage; and |
|
(H) insider threats caused by compromised or |
|
hostile personnel working within government or the utility |
|
industry. |
|
(2) "Micro-grid" means a group of interconnected loads |
|
and distributed energy resources inside clearly defined electrical |
|
boundaries. |
|
(3) "Security commission" means the Texas Grid |
|
Security Commission. |
|
Sec. 44.002. TEXAS GRID SECURITY COMMISSION. (a) The Texas |
|
Grid Security Commission is composed of the following members: |
|
(1) a representative of the Texas Division of |
|
Emergency Management appointed by the chief of that division; |
|
(2) a representative of the commission appointed by |
|
that commission; |
|
(3) a representative of the Railroad Commission of |
|
Texas appointed by that commission; |
|
(4) a representative of the independent organization |
|
certified under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT power region appointed |
|
by the chief executive officer of that organization; |
|
(5) a representative of power generation companies |
|
appointed by the chief of the Texas Division of Emergency |
|
Management; and |
|
(6) a representative of transmission and distribution |
|
utilities appointed by the chief of the Texas Division of Emergency |
|
Management. |
|
(b) The Texas Division of Emergency Management shall |
|
designate a member of the security commission to serve as presiding |
|
officer. |
|
(c) The security commission shall convene at the call of the |
|
presiding officer. |
|
(d) The security commission shall report to the chief of the |
|
Texas Division of Emergency Management. |
|
(e) A vacancy on the security commission is filled by |
|
appointment for the unexpired term in the same manner as the |
|
original appointment. |
|
(f) To the extent possible, individuals appointed to the |
|
security commission must be residents of this state. |
|
(g) The chief of the Texas Division of Emergency Management |
|
may invite officials or former officials of the United States |
|
Department of Defense or Department of Homeland Security with |
|
expertise on electromagnetic pulse defense to advise the security |
|
commission. |
|
(h) The presiding officer of the security commission or the |
|
chief of the Texas Division of Emergency Management may invite to |
|
advise the security commission any person whose expertise the |
|
security commission considers necessary to carry out the purposes |
|
of this chapter, including individuals recognized as experts in the |
|
fields of law enforcement, emergency services, communications, |
|
water and sewer services, health care, financial services, |
|
agriculture, transportation, electricity markets, cybersecurity of |
|
grid control systems, electromagnetic pulse mitigation, |
|
terrestrial and solar weather, and micro-grids. |
|
Sec. 44.003. GRID RESILIENCE INFORMATION. (a) Each of the |
|
following members of the security commission shall apply for a |
|
secret security clearance or an interim secret security clearance |
|
to be granted by the federal government: |
|
(1) the representative of the independent |
|
organization certified under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT power |
|
region; |
|
(2) the representative of the Texas Division of |
|
Emergency Management; and |
|
(3) the representative of the commission. |
|
(b) A member of the security commission listed under |
|
Subsection (a) who is granted an applicable security clearance |
|
under that subsection is a member of the information security |
|
working group. |
|
(c) The information security working group shall determine: |
|
(1) which information created or obtained by the |
|
security commission is confidential; |
|
(2) which members of the security commission may |
|
access which types of information received by the security |
|
commission; and |
|
(3) which members, other than members of the working |
|
group, should apply for a secret security clearance or interim |
|
clearance granted by the federal government. |
|
(d) Information that the information security working group |
|
determines is confidential under Subsection (c) shall be stored and |
|
maintained by the independent organization certified under Section |
|
39.151 for the ERCOT power region. |
|
(e) The security commission must maintain a reasonable |
|
balance between public transparency and security for information |
|
determined to be confidential under Subsection (c). |
|
(f) Confidential information created or obtained by the |
|
security commission is not subject to disclosure under Chapter 552, |
|
Government Code. |
|
(g) A meeting of the security commission that involves the |
|
discussion of confidential information is not subject to Chapter |
|
551, Government Code. |
|
Sec. 44.004. GRID RESILIENCE EVALUATION. (a) The security |
|
commission shall evaluate, using available information on past |
|
power outages in ERCOT, all hazards to the ERCOT electric grid, |
|
including threats that can cause future outages. The security |
|
commission shall evaluate the resilience of municipalities in this |
|
state in the following essential areas: |
|
(1) emergency services; |
|
(2) communications systems; |
|
(3) water and sewer services; |
|
(4) health care systems; |
|
(5) financial services; |
|
(6) energy systems, including whether energy, |
|
electric power, and fuel supplies are protected and available for |
|
recovery in the event of a catastrophic power outage; and |
|
(7) transportation systems. |
|
(b) The security commission may create groups to identify |
|
and address each hazard as necessary. The security commission must |
|
assess each hazard both on the likelihood of occurrence of the |
|
hazard and the potential consequences of the hazard. |
|
(c) The security commission shall identify methods by which |
|
this state can support an overall national deterrence policy as |
|
proposed by the United States Cyberspace Solarium Commission, |
|
including by: |
|
(1) identifying means to ensure that measures taken to |
|
increase resilience of electric utilities against all hazards |
|
support critical national security functions in this state; and |
|
(2) engaging the Texas National Guard to be trained as |
|
first responders to cybersecurity threats to the ERCOT electric |
|
grid and other critical infrastructure. |
|
(d) The security commission shall evaluate nuclear |
|
generation sites in this state, the resilience of each nuclear |
|
reactor to all hazards, and the resilience to all hazards of |
|
off-site power for critical safety systems that support the reactor |
|
and spent fuel. The security commission may communicate with the |
|
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to accomplish the evaluation. |
|
(e) The security commission shall evaluate current Critical |
|
Infrastructure Protection standards established by the North |
|
American Electric Reliability Corporation and standards set by the |
|
National Institute of Standards and Technology to determine the |
|
most appropriate standards for protecting grid infrastructure in |
|
this state. |
|
(f) The security commission shall investigate the steps |
|
that local communities and other states have taken to address grid |
|
resilience. The security commission may request funding from the |
|
Texas Division of Emergency Management to conduct site visits to |
|
these locations as required. |
|
(g) The security commission shall identify universities |
|
based in this state that have expertise in cybersecurity and other |
|
matters that can contribute to the security commission's goal of |
|
mitigating all hazards to the grid in this state. |
|
(h) In carrying out the security commission's duties under |
|
this section, the security commission may solicit information from: |
|
(1) defense contractors with experience protecting |
|
defense systems from electromagnetic pulses; |
|
(2) electric utilities that have developed |
|
electromagnetic pulse protections for the utilities' grid assets; |
|
(3) the United States Department of Homeland Security; |
|
and |
|
(4) the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United |
|
States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack. |
|
Sec. 44.005. RESILIENCE STANDARDS. (a) Based on the |
|
findings of the evaluations and investigations conducted under |
|
Section 44.004, the security commission shall consider and |
|
recommend resilience standards for municipalities and critical |
|
components of the ERCOT electric grid. |
|
(b) Standards considered and recommended for energy systems |
|
of municipalities should include provisions to ensure that energy, |
|
electric power, and fuel supplies are protected and available for |
|
recovery in the event of a catastrophic power outage. |
|
(c) Not later than October 1, 2026, the security commission |
|
shall prepare and deliver a report to the legislature on the |
|
recommended resilience standards required under this section and an |
|
anticipated timeline for implementation of the standards. |
|
Sec. 44.006. MICRO-GRIDS. The security commission shall |
|
recommend resilience standards for micro-grids. The standards must |
|
be developed for both alternating current and direct current. |
|
Sec. 44.007. PLAN FOR ALL HAZARDS RESILIENCE. (a) Not |
|
later than October 1, 2026, the security commission shall prepare |
|
and deliver to the legislature a plan for protecting the ERCOT |
|
electric grid from all hazards, including a catastrophic loss of |
|
power in the state. |
|
(b) The plan must include: |
|
(1) any weatherization requirements in addition to |
|
requirements established under Section 35.0021 necessary to |
|
prevent power outages from extreme cold weather events, an analysis |
|
of whether these requirements would induce cyber vulnerabilities, |
|
and an analysis of the associated costs for these requirements; |
|
(2) provisions for installing, replacing, or |
|
upgrading industrial control systems and associated networks, or |
|
the use of compensating controls or procedures, in critical |
|
facilities to address cyber vulnerabilities; |
|
(3) provisions for installing, replacing, or |
|
upgrading extra high-voltage power transformers and supervisory |
|
control and data acquisition systems to withstand 100 |
|
kilovolts/meter E1 electromagnetic pulses and 85 volts/kilometer |
|
E3 electromagnetic pulses; |
|
(4) a timeline for making improvements to remaining |
|
infrastructure to meet resilience standards adopted by the security |
|
commission under Section 44.005; |
|
(5) long-term resilience provisions for supporting |
|
industries including: |
|
(A) communications; |
|
(B) food supply; |
|
(C) fuel supply; |
|
(D) health care; |
|
(E) nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; |
|
(F) transportation; and |
|
(G) water and sewer services; and |
|
(6) any additional provisions considered necessary by |
|
the security commission. |
|
(c) The security commission may consult with the Private |
|
Sector Advisory Council in developing the plan. |
|
Sec. 44.008. GRID RESILIENCE REPORT. (a) Not later than |
|
January 1 of each year, the security commission shall prepare and |
|
deliver a nonclassified report to the legislature, the governor, |
|
and the commission assessing natural and man-made threats to the |
|
electric grid and efforts to mitigate the threats. |
|
(b) The security commission shall make the report available |
|
to the public. |
|
(c) In preparing the report, the security commission may |
|
hold confidential or classified briefings with federal, state, and |
|
local officials as necessary. |
|
SECTION 3. This Act takes effect immediately if it receives |
|
a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, as |
|
provided by Section 39, Article III, Texas Constitution. If this |
|
Act does not receive the vote necessary for immediate effect, this |
|
Act takes effect September 1, 2025. |