1-1     By:  Lucio                                              S.B. No. 39
 1-2           (In the Senate - Filed November 9, 1998; January 26, 1999,
 1-3     read first time and referred to Committee on Criminal Justice;
 1-4     April 19, 1999, reported favorably, as amended, by the following
 1-5     vote:  Yeas 7, Nays 0; April 19, 1999, sent to printer.)
 1-6     COMMITTEE AMENDMENT NO. 1                              By:  Jackson
 1-7     Amend S.B. No. 39 by striking SECTION 2, and renumbering
 1-8     accordingly.
 1-9     COMMITTEE AMENDMENT NO. 2                              By:  Shapiro
1-10     Amend S.B. No. 39 by deleting SECTION 3 and adding the following in
1-11     its place:
1-12           SECTION 3.  (a)  The change in law made by this Act applies
1-13     only to an offense committed on or after the effective date of this
1-14     Act.
1-15           (b)  An offense committed before the effective date of this
1-16     Act is covered by the law in effect when the offense was committed,
1-17     and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose.
1-18           (c)  This Act takes effect September 1, 1999.
1-19                            A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
1-20                                   AN ACT
1-21     relating to jury instructions and charges in capital cases.
1-22           BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
1-23           SECTION 1.  Subsection (e), Section 2, Article 37.071, Code
1-24     of Criminal Procedure, is amended to read as follows:
1-25           (e)(1)  The court shall instruct the jury that if the jury
1-26     returns an affirmative finding to each issue submitted under
1-27     Subsection (b) of this article, it shall answer the following
1-28     issue:
1-29           Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence,
1-30     including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's
1-31     character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the
1-32     defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or
1-33     circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment
1-34     rather than a death sentence be imposed.
1-35                 (2)  The court, on the written request of the attorney
1-36     representing the defendant, shall:
1-37                       (A)  instruct the jury that if the jury answers
1-38     that a circumstance or circumstances warrant that a sentence of
1-39     life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed, the
1-40     court will sentence the defendant to imprisonment in the
1-41     institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
1-42     for life; and
1-43                       (B)  charge the jury in writing as follows:
1-44                       "Under the law applicable in this case, if the
1-45     defendant is sentenced to imprisonment in the institutional
1-46     division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life, the
1-47     defendant will become eligible for release on parole, but not until
1-48     the actual time served by the defendant equals 40 years, without
1-49     consideration of any good conduct time.  It cannot accurately be
1-50     predicted how the parole laws might be applied to this defendant if
1-51     the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life
1-52     because the application of those laws will depend on decisions made
1-53     by prison and parole authorities, but eligibility for parole does
1-54     not guarantee that parole will be granted."
1-55           SECTION 2.  Subsection (e), Section 3, Article 37.0711, Code
1-56     of Criminal Procedure, is amended to read as follows:
1-57           (e)(1)  The court shall instruct the jury that if the jury
1-58     returns an affirmative finding on each issue submitted under
1-59     Subsection (b) of this section, it shall answer the following
1-60     issue:
1-61           Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence,
 2-1     including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's
 2-2     character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the
 2-3     defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or
 2-4     circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment
 2-5     rather than a death sentence be imposed.
 2-6                 (2)  The court, on the written request of the attorney
 2-7     representing the defendant, shall:
 2-8                       (A)  instruct the jury that if the jury answers
 2-9     that a circumstance or circumstances warrant that a sentence of
2-10     life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed, the
2-11     court will sentence the defendant to imprisonment in the
2-12     institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
2-13     for life; and
2-14                       (B)  charge the jury in writing as follows:
2-15                       "Under the law applicable in this case, if the
2-16     defendant is sentenced to imprisonment in the institutional
2-17     division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life, the
2-18     defendant will become eligible for release on parole, but not until
2-19     the actual time served by the defendant equals 40 years, without
2-20     consideration of any good conduct time.  It cannot accurately be
2-21     predicted how the parole laws might be applied to this defendant if
2-22     the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life
2-23     because the application of those laws will depend on decisions made
2-24     by prison and parole authorities, but eligibility for parole does
2-25     not guarantee that parole will be granted."
2-26           SECTION 3.  (a)  The change in law made by this Act applies
2-27     in a capital case only to a sentencing proceeding that begins on or
2-28     after the effective date of this Act.
2-29           (b)  A sentencing proceeding that begins before the effective
2-30     date of this Act is covered by the law in effect when the
2-31     sentencing proceeding began, and the former law is continued in
2-32     effect for that purpose.
2-33           SECTION 4.  The importance of this legislation and the
2-34     crowded condition of the calendars in both houses create an
2-35     emergency and an imperative public necessity that the
2-36     constitutional rule requiring bills to be read on three several
2-37     days in each house be suspended, and this rule is hereby suspended,
2-38     and that this Act take effect and be in force from and after its
2-39     passage, and it is so enacted.
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