BILL ANALYSIS

 

 

 

C.S.H.B. 2973

By: Coleman

Criminal Jurisprudence

Committee Report (Substituted)

 

 

 

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

 

Under current law, a person may be found not guilty by reason of insanity if, at the time of the offense, the person did not know the difference between right and wrong. Due to this restrictive language, an individual with a legitimate insanity claim may have a difficult time convincing a jury of the individual's condition. Individuals who are seriously mentally ill, delusional, or suffering from psychosis may retain intellectual understanding or cognitive capacity but mental illness can affect a person's emotions and reason to such a degree that the person cannot completely or willfully control the person's own behavior. If a defendant knows that the defendant's conduct is prohibited by law, the defendant is considered sane for purposes of the Texas insanity defense. The law does not consider how mental illness may cloud a defendant's perception and render the defendant unable to appreciate the moral wrongfulness of the defendant's actions, therefore leaving the defendant unable to conform his or her behavior to the requirements of law.

 

Additional problems with the insanity defense arise because attorneys are not permitted to inform jurors of the potential consequences of a not guilty verdict by reason of insanity. Many jurors come to court with the incorrect assumption that an acquittal on the grounds of insanity means that the defendant is permitted to return to the community despite an impairment. This lack of awareness prevents some jurors from contemplating the consequences of their decision on the defendant's life. 

 

C.S.H.B. 2973 redefines the standard of legal insanity by suggesting that because the defendant was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her acts, the defendant is permitted to assert the insanity claim as an affirmative defense, and requires the court to inform a jury of the consequences of its verdict on a defendant.

RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

 

It is the committee's opinion that this bill does not expressly grant any additional rulemaking authority to a state officer, department, agency, or institution.

ANALYSIS

 

C.S.H.B. 2973 amends the Penal Code to change the standard of legal insanity to specify that it is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the defendant was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of the defendant's acts, rather than did not know that the defendant's conduct was wrong, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the defense, due to severe mental disease or defect.

 

C.S.H.B. 2973 amends the Code of Criminal Procedure to transfer Article 46C.002, regarding the maximum period of commitment determined by the maximum term for an offense for a person acquitted by reason of insanity; Article 46C.268, regarding the advance discharge of an acquitted person and the termination of jurisdiction; and Article 46C.269, regarding the termination of the court's jurisdiction over the acquitted person, to new Subchapter G, Chapter 46C, and to renumber those articles as Articles 46C.302, 46C.303, and 46C.304, respectively. The bill establishes that those transferred provisions apply to a person acquitted by reason of insanity under current state law regarding the insanity defense or under former Article 46.03 regarding the insanity defense, as that article existed before September 1, 2005, and makes conforming changes to reflect that establishment.

 

C.S.H.B. 2973 requires the court to provide instruction to the jury to inform the jury of the consequences to the defendant if a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is returned, and provides the substantial form of such instruction.

 

C.S.H.B. 2973 removes the prohibition against the court, the attorney representing the state, and the attorney for the defendant from informing a juror or a prospective juror of the consequences to the defendant of such an acquittal.

 

EFFECTIVE DATE

 

September 1, 2009.

COMPARISON OF ORIGINAL AND SUBSTITUTE

C.S.H.B. 2973 differs from the original by specifying that it is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the defendant was unable to appreciate, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense and due to severe mental disease or defect, the wrongfulness of the defendant's acts, whereas the original specifies that it is a defense to prosecution in such situation that the alleged offender did not appreciate at the time of the alleged crime charged, due to severe mental disease or defect, that the conduct was legally or morally wrong.

 

C.S.H.B. 2973 adds a provision not in the original setting forth detailed language for the instruction the court is required to provide a jury regarding consequences to a defendant if a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is returned.