By: Patrick, et al. S.B. No. 29
  relating to prosecution and punishment for the offense of official
  oppression by the intrusive touching of persons seeking access to
  public buildings and transportation; providing penalties.
         SECTION 1.  Section 39.03, Penal Code, is amended by
  amending Subsections (a) and (b) and adding Subsections (c-1),
  (c-2), and (c-3) to read as follows:
         (a)  A person who is a public servant [acting under color of
  his office or employment] commits an offense if the person:
               (1)  while acting under color of the person's office or
  employment [he]:
                     (A) [(1)]  intentionally subjects another person
  to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure,
  dispossession, assessment, or lien that the actor [he] knows is
                     (B) [(2)]  intentionally denies or impedes
  another person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right,
  privilege, power, or immunity, knowing the actor's [his] conduct is
  unlawful; or
                     (C) [(3)]  intentionally subjects another person
  to sexual harassment; or
               (2)  while acting under color of the person's office or
  employment without reasonable suspicion of the presence of an
  unknown, unlawful, or prohibited object:
                     (A)  performs a search without effective consent
  for the purpose of granting access to a publicly accessible
  building or form of transportation; and
                     (B)  intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
  touches the anus, sexual organ, buttocks, or breast of the other
  person, including touching through clothing.
         (b)  For purposes of this section, a person who is a public
  servant acts under color of the person's [his] office or employment
  if the person [he] acts or purports to act in an official capacity
  or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity.
         (c-1)  For purposes of Subsection (a)(2), "public servant"
               (1)  an officer, employee, or agent of:
                     (A)  the United States;
                     (B)  a branch, department, or agency of the United
  States; or
                     (C)  another person acting under contract with a
  branch, department, or agency of the United States for the purpose
  of providing a security or law enforcement service; and
               (2)  any other person acting under color of federal
         (c-2)  For purposes of Subsection (a)(2), and
  notwithstanding Sections 1.07(a)(11) and (19), consent is
  effective only if, immediately before any search:
               (1)  the actor verbally describes:
                     (A)  the area of the other person to be searched;
                     (B)  the method to be used in the search; and
               (2)  the actor receives express consent for the search
  only from:
                     (A)  the other person; or
                     (B)  the parent or guardian of the other person.
         (c-3)  This section shall be construed, as a matter of state
  law, to be enforceable up to but no further than the maximum
  possible extent consistent with federal constitutional
  requirements, even if that construction is not readily apparent, as
  such constructions are authorized only to the extent necessary to
  save the section from judicial invalidation.
         SECTION 2.  (a)  This section applies only to a prosecution
  of an offense under Subdivision (2), Subsection (a), Section 39.03,
  Penal Code, as added by this Act, in which the defendant was, at the
  time of the alleged offense, acting under the color of federal law.
         (b)  In a prosecution described by Subsection (a) of this
  section, if the government of the United States, the defendant, or
  the defendant's employer challenges the validity of Subdivision
  (2), Subsection (a), Section 39.03, Penal Code, as added by this
  Act, on grounds of unconstitutionality, preemption, or sovereign
  immunity, the attorney general of this state, with the consent of
  the appropriate local county or district attorney, shall take any
  actions necessary on behalf of the state to defend the validity of
  the statute. The attorney general may make any legal arguments the
  attorney general considers appropriate, including that this Act
  constitutes a valid exercise of:
               (1)  the state's police powers;
               (2)  the liberty interests of the people that are
  secured by the United States Constitution;
               (3)  the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth
  Amendment to the United States Constitution; or
               (4)  the rights and protections secured by the Texas
         SECTION 3.  This Act takes effect on the 91st day after the
  last day of the legislative session.